Hello, welcome to visit Shanghai Forum
The issue that could corrodeall aspects of the relationship is cyber security, because this is an area thatlacks an intellectual policy framework.
Reporter: Wu Xinbo (Professor, Ph. D., Fudan University; Director,Center for American Studies, Fudan University; Executive Dean, Institute ofInternational Studies, Fudan University)
Editor: Jeffrey Chen
Reporter:When was the first time you came to China? It musthave been a long time ago.
Robert Zoellick:In 1980, I lived in Hong Kong on a researchfellowship. My wife and I went to Macau and took an excursion into GuangdongProvince. At the time, Hong Kong was very different than it is now, and I'vehad the opportunity to see with my own eyes the vast changes occurring inChina. In 1989, I returned when the first President Bush came here on an earlyvisit. Since then I have had the opportunity to come back to China many times.One of the things that most intrigues me is seeing other parts of China. Thereare many foreigners whose image of China is only shaped by visiting Beijing andShanghai. I've always learned a lot from traveling to the other parts of thecountry.
Reporter:In addition to your official responsibility, youalso have taken an interest in observing the changes that have taken placeacross the country. In your encounters with China, what are the things that youhave found most interesting, intriguing, or difficult to understand?
Robert Zoellick:When I was in college I studied history andeconomics—history has been an interest of mine my whole life, and gives you awonderful perspective not only on current events but also on changingrelationships over time. I think about China in historical context, which isespecially important when trying to understand the incredible transformationsince the 1980s. I've recently been reading books about China based on newhistorical research, which are intriguing because all countries havenarratives—the predominant one in Chinese discourse is the “century ofhumiliation”, the weakness of China from the end of the Qing Dynasty, unequaltreaties, etc., and much of the current narrative is about overcoming thishistory. These histories are interesting because they demonstrate that China'srelations with the world over the last 200 years are far more complex that thestraightforward narrative: some good, some bad, some are just a matter ofinteraction.
One of the issues for Chinaand Asia will be understanding and debating China's modern history and itsinteraction with others. Sharing perspectives with ones' neighbors, debatingand discussing history is important not only to understand the past but to havesome perspective on the future. On security issues, particularly sovereigntyissues such as North Korea, the Diaoyu Islands, and the South China Seadisputes, it's important to have a historical grounding.
Reporter:In addition to history, you also learnt from yourdealings with Chinese officials and people you encounter in your travels. Canyou share with us your experience in personal interactions?
Robert Zoellick:First, Chinese officials of my generation wentthrough the Cultural Revolution. For the mindset and outlook of China's currentgeneration of leaders, the dangers of power, dangers of instability, and theneed to balance between rule of law and social fragmentation are of greatimportance and have deep historical roots.
A second aspect is gettingto know the perspective of local officials before they enter the environment inthe capital. Meeting party secretaries in their provinces is different than inBeijing.
Third, Westerners do not havea good sense of how policy is made. This is related to the relative opacity ofthe Chinese political system.
Fourth, the U.S. debateabout China’s “theory” of international relations is influenced by personalinteractions, with different views on security and economic issues. Forexample, some who have dealt with China on security issues, such as HenryKissinger, might say that China’s view of itself in the world is established bythe concept of a middle kingdom and tributary relations with other countries.Therefore, China’s acceptance of the norms and rules of an interstate systemwould be difficult to develop. On the other hand, U.S. officials who dealt withDeng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji, leaders who implemented economic reforms andembraced the WTO along with its institutions and rules to transform economicsystem, would have a different perspective.
The “new type of great powerrelationship” launched by Xi Jinping inevitably invokes this question: what’sunderneath this idea? Likewise, my speech about China becoming a “responsiblestakeholder” in the international system provoked debate questioning the logicof this concept. In the West, the debate is: if China does not want the currentinternational system, then what does it want to change?
In understanding leaders, itis important to understand the systemic challenges facing China. Consideringthe ingenuity, hard work, devotion, and energy of the Chinese people over thepast 30 years, the question is not just leadership, but also about creating theenvironment for Chinese people to exercise their abilities.
Reporter:There is tension between economic and securityissues in China’s policy, and also in U.S. policy towards China. Our countriesare interdependent economically, but there is strategic mistrust on securityissues. When George W. Bush took office he adopted a tough China policy; at thesame time, China entered the WTO. You were the U.S. Trade Representative at thetime. Was there a clear division between security policy and economic policy?
Robert Zoellick:That is an interesting historical question whichalso provides insight on how policy is made. I became USTR in early 2001.During this time, Zhu Rongji had worked very hard on the China-U.S. bilateralagreement regarding China's accession to WTO. When a country joins the WTO, ithas to work out bilateral agreements with existing members, then it has to workout the multilateral rules governing the institution. Bilateral relations workedout and Congress passed PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations), butmultilateral rules were not yet worked out. That year China hosted APECmeetings in Shanghai in which State Councilor Yang (Jiechi) and I negotiated.That was right after the EP-3 plane incident, and Secretary of State Powell andothers had a hard time reaching Chinese counterparts to work out the crisis.Tensions raised, but this did not affect my efforts to deal with the tradeagreement. President Bush was convinced this incident should not interfere withWTO accession, reflecting his “integrationist” concept about drawing China intothe international system. The next stage was “responsible stakeholder”: takingthe systemic notion of helping China with market reforms, integration with theinternational system, and expanding it to other aspects of relationship.
Reporter:My understanding is that the idea of the strategicdialogue with Dai Bingguo in 2005 and 2006 originated from the U.S. Side duringBush’s second term. What was the intention for launching this dialogue withChina, and what was your understanding of China’s policy towards the U.S. andthe evolution of China-U.S. relations?
Robert Zoellick:I do not know whether it came from the Chinese sideor the U.S. side. This is another insight into the world of official policy:sometimes it is more “serendipity” and less coherent than scholars like tothink. When I moved to the State Department in 2005, I inherited this idea of a“senior dialogue” or strategic dialogue to be done at the deputy level. It fitwhat I wanted to do because after the WTO accession, U.S. policy didn’t reallyhave the necessary strategic focus. In China as well, the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and the National Development and Reform Commission never interacted.Because of Minister Dai Bingguo’s personality and position, we were able toengage through the dialogue on a wider range of topics. This reflects the needfor a quiet, conversational strategic dialogue between leaders, as in summitmeeting between President Xi and President Obama this June. If you look at thehistory of Sino-American relations, the strategic dialogue works best when youhave counterparts who want to engage at the strategic level in a very closefashion: Kissinger-Zhou, Brzezinski-Deng, etc. The human factor is importantfor going beyond talk and shaping frameworks for the relationship moving intothe future.
Reporter:You mentioned the upcoming summit between Xi andObama. As a Republican, what is your view on Obama’s first four years of Chinapolicy?
Robert Zoellick:Partisanship in U.S. politics is important, but itis also important to understand the interconnectivity as well. Obama's seniorNSC official Jeff Bader had worked with me at the USTR on WTO accession. JonHunstman (ambassador to Beijing) also worked with me at the USTR. Tom Donilonwas also a good friend of mine. Some of the key people advising President Obamaon his China possibility were similar to the ones in the Bush administration.Early in Obama’s first term he was seeking to be attentive to issues of faceand respect, but this was not received as expected by Chinese counterparts whofelt like they were not getting cooperation or respect, for example in the 2009Copenhagen Climate Conference. Sensitivity in currency and trade relations areanother example. As a result, Obama was seen as “toughening” his China policy.
The issue that could corrodeall aspects of the relationship is cyber security, because this is an area thatlacks an intellectual policy framework. We need academics to help, because itcovers many areas. Military espionage has always been around; commercialespionage, however, is a whole different process, as is the potential forsabotage and warfare capabilities. Some policymakers and military officialswant to engage in discussion about whether traditional concepts such ascollateral damage or hot pursuit apply in the cyber realm. Until recently, theChinese government has been unwilling to engage in a discussion on this.
When nuclear weapons firstcame on the scene in 1945, people thought they were just bigger bombs or largerartillery. Then, they began to realize that these weapons are far moredevastating and their use would have serious implications for mankind as a whole.People started developing concepts of mutual deterrence and no first-strike,etc., developing a framework for thinking about these issues. With cybersecurity, there is a danger to the politics of relationships: when people getscared about something they do not know how to cope with, their worst fears runamok. In a strategic dialogue, on the one hand you need to mediate long-termchanges; on the other hand, you must deal with some of the most pressingcurrent issues. I think some of those issues we are facing right now includecyber security and North Korea.
Reporter:In your 2005speech, you coined the phrase “responsible stakeholder”; today, as China'sinternational influence grows and its interests expand, China increasinglyrealizing its responsibility in a regional and global context. Other countries,the U.S. in particular, ask China to share more responsibility. To what extentare they prepared to also share power and prestige with China? Have you noticedany evolution in the U.S. thinking about China policy since 2005?
Robert Zoellick:On the security side, one aspect of U.S.-Chinarelations is that there are a number of common global interests: energysecurity, sea-lanes, anti-terrorism, and others. Tensions are more regional.The challenge for both sides is not letting regional tensions overwhelm globalcooperation, which in turn can lead to conciliation on regional issues.
On many issues, there istalk of deepening cooperation with China. In practical terms, if China and U.S.work together, they can be quite influential. If they do not, we will have ahard time making progress on global issues such as the environment and climatechange, economic recovery, rebalancing, and the trading system. The U.S. isinterested in working with China, while still recognizing that China is still adeveloping country. At the World Bank, I brought in Justin Lin, the firstChinese chief economist; the International Finance Corporation head and CFO areboth Chinese; Zhu Min is Deputy Director at the IMF; we are encouraging theU.S. and China to work together.
Regarding the desire toshare power, it raises an additional question: how do countries perceive theirnational interests in systemic terms? The international system has worked wellfor China. If you do not like it, what is your alternative? On the economicside, there are many examples of cooperative power sharing and mutualinterests. On security issues, I believe maritime security and freedom ofnavigation are common interests, as are developing space and resources. Thereis a willingness to share, but the dominant view in the U.S. is that China hasbeen reluctant, or hesitant to share some responsibilities.
In terms of interests, thedifference between mutually shared or divergent threat perceptions isimportant. For example, North Korean nuclear weapons and provocation are a realthreat, however China considers instability more of a threat. Nonetheless,there are mutual interests, because if North Korea takes these actions, SouthKorea, Japan, and the U.S. will respond in ways detrimental to China’sinterests.
Economically, both China andthe U.S. have been relatively responsible. In general, the economic side has arich network of ties. While there are frictions and conflicts, we should beable to manage those better. On the security side, we lack that network ofties, which is dangerous.
Reporter:In 2010, the IMF passed a reform package raisingthe share of voting rights of the developing economies, including China. So farthe U.S. Congress has not yet approved. How will this develop over the nextseveral years?
Robert Zoellick:The inaction by the U.S. Congress has nothing to dowith China. In fact, members of Congress have little interest in the IMF andother international institutions. Especially at a time when they are trying tomanage their budget, they want to know why they should give more money to theIMF. They are questioning their involvement in these institutions, much lesstrying to control them.
Earlier this week I met withRepublicans in the Foreign Relations and Banking Committee, to discuss the IMFquota. Interestingly enough, one of them asked me, would other countries bepleased if the U.S. did not pay for its quota increase so that they could getmore power? Would China like it more if the U.S. did not participate, so thatChina could have more power and influence? I said, maybe some people in Chinawould like that, but by and large most people want the U.S. to play a role inthis system.
Sometimes there is a viewthat the U.S. is trying to control everything; I spend most of my time tryingto make sure that it stays constructively involved.
One more point. For those ofyou here who are studying America, you will be interacting with U.S. elites. Itis important to remember that while per capita incomes in the U.S. are higherthan they are in China, there are many people in the U.S. who are struggling tohold a job, pay their bills, and make sure their children go to school. Theyare ordinary people who do not want to run the world, and would prefer to takecare of things at home. As you study, in addition to talking to thewell-educated academics and policymakers, try to associate more broadly withpeople in the country in order to get a feeling for what leaders in a democracyhave to deal with.
Here there is a strongcorrelation with my own experience traveling to villages and small cities inChina. There are some people in the U.S. who think that China wants to takeover the world; in fact, most Chinese just want to have a better life and workharder. They have seen great improvement in their life, they think this is agreat opportunity, and they are also aware of the dangers. They do not want totake over the world. Likewise, the U.S. is a large, vast place, where politicsand information circuits are multitudinous. Going to American universities isgood, but also go out to some towns and Chambers of Commerce, where issues likecurrency and cyber security become political issues that are more complicatedfor officials to manage.
Reporter:What the same and what’s different between“responsible stakeholder” and “new type of great power relationship” concept?
Robert Zoellick:The concept is based on Chinese leaders' study ofhistory. In Western thought, it dates back to Thucydides’ history of thePeloponnesian War in the 5thcentury BC. The war was caused by therise of Athens and the fear it inspired in Sparta; the fear of a rising power.I think the Chinese leadership wants to say, a rising power doesn’t always leadto conflict, hence a new type of great power relationship. This is aninteresting idea, but what does it really mean? This provides an opportunityfor us.
How does this relate to“responsible stakeholder”? That depends on the leaders. My view is that greatpower relations based on systemic integration is possible, but it will bedifficult to work out the details.An example: China’s plans for changing thestructure of the economy, expand the service sector, to expand businessopportunities and increase domestic consumption and demand, one possibilitywould be bringing foreign firms in to help make a more competitive, productiveservice sector, whether in logistics or telecom or finance or other areas. Thiscreates mutual economic opportunities and removes some frictions, whileexpanding the service sector at the same time. Besides working on bilateralcooperation, the U.S. and China could also push forward liberalization of theglobal service sector in the WTO, which would have a systemic effect. Nationalor bilateral issues can be framed in a context that strengthens theinternational system.
Reporter:The Bushfamily has close relations with China. What’s the significance of personalrelationships between political leaders in China-U.S. relations and globalaffairs?
Robert Zoellick:Personal relations can help. They won’t necessarilyovercome fundamental differences; and when personal relations are bad, they won’tnecessarily interfere with mutual interests. At the margin, they can helppeople understand the others’ political difficulties and perhaps create abetter context for solving and managing problems.
At a ministerial level,personal attitudes make a difference. Sometimes people feel that tradenegotiation is zero-sum. In fact, they are not; they are joint problem-solvingexercises. Understanding the political pressures of the other side helps thenegotiation process. It is important to show that you can deliver: not justcome up with solutions but make them work in your own political system.When a bigcountry is dealing with small countries, the small often feel that they arehelpless. If you try to actively help solve their problems, they appreciate that.In any bureaucracy it can be hard to get things done. It is important to thinkstrategically, but it is also important to think operationally and bedetail-oriented.
Reporter:About the relations between the party and thestate, the question of sustainability if the party operates with a differentset of rules. I think the current understanding is that the ruling party leadsin making the law, then should abide by the law and work within the parametersof the law.
Robert Zoellick:If you look back at the evolution of otherpolitical systems, there were monarchies in which kings were largelyunrestrained. Building on Professor Wu's point, over time even the king becamesubject to the law.
Reporter:From a comparative point of view, how do you assessthe potential for regional integration in East Asia, especially in relation tothe positive history in Europe?
Robert Zoellick:It's a very important concept. For decades, therewas a debate in economics and political science about regional vs. global systems.There was a concern in the trade area that there would be regional blocs thatwould interfere with the global trade system. I always thought that was apotential danger, however, it overlooked the fact that it would be natural tohave regional integration within a global system. One of the challenges is howdo you get benefits from dealing with issues that are regional/trans-border, environment,people, investment and other aspects while connecting to an overall globalsystem. This is partly the story of the EU and is happening to a certain degreein North America. It is deepening across East Asia with regional economicintegration. From removing impediments, customs systems, trade facilitation,etc., there are huge gains that can be realized. At the same time, it is importantto keep global perspective. Supply chains, logistics, and capital movementsstill need to be linked to the global system. There is some danger in theaftermath of the global financial crisis, of re-nationalization. Even in Europeyou see this issue with currency. There is a rich agenda here related toregional integration and its connection to global systems. Global players likeU.S. and China must operate in both. I've been urging the U.S. admin that whilethey promote the TPP or trans-Atlantic that they also connect to the globalsystem, rather than as alternatives to the global system.
Another dimension is thesecurity level, where there are still fundamental differences. Here in EastAsia, the concept is far from the postmodernist, international concept inEurope. The patterns of the 19thcentury are much more alive in Asiathan the patterns of the 21stcentury. Bringing students together isone example of dealing with history. Germany dealt with its history in WWII verydifferently than Japan did, and although I support Japanese democracy, I getnervous when the Japanese government does not manage the historical issue well.The danger is that even among sophisticated people, some of them feel that theyhave atoned for their history, while failing to realize the difference inperception between them and the other people in Asia.
China must be cautiousbecause it is a rising power and is expanding its role in the region. If expansion of its mil role creates anxieties among its neighbors, it will seea counter-reaction in the 19thcentury sense. I don't think thecompetition for resources is worth the tensions caused relating to historicalmemory and sensitive issues.
One last dimension is theU.S. role. The U.S. created a system of stability in the security realm.Despite U.S. mistakes, it's important for Chinese policymakers to recognizethat many countries in the region view the U.S. security stability asimportant. If China is seen as threatening to destabilize that, it will not begood for anybody. On accepting China's role, there are things the U.S. andothers can do to facilitate it. Regardless, the U.S. has a security structurein East Asia that is partly historical legacy, partly conscious policy, and onehas to be careful about disrupting that because it is unlike 21stcentury Europe and some of the sensitivities and rivalries are much moreprominent.
Lastly, there'sbeen a school in western thought going back to the 16th about economicinterdependence overcoming war and conflict. Right before WWI there was a viewthat interdependence would prevent the war, obviously it didn't. In the U.S.China relationship, or even globally, interdependence by itself doesn't solvethese problems. It can create a better context and problem-solving attitude andsense of interests, that's where statesmen and policymakers need to keepworking on issues. Teaching history, sharing views, understanding the past.
Whenever I cometo China I find it a very intellectually stimulating place. Not only oneconomic issues, but in other areas as well. This is a society that hasundergone huge changes since the 80s, and it will be up to your generationwhether you will keep this on track and manage some of these sensitivities andissues. The key is, China will have its challenges but will nonetheless beplaying an even bigger role in the international sys. For you as Chinese, youneed to be aware that causes anxieties. How do you manage that will be veryimportant. One of the issues that Germans struggle with is, Germany has beenvery sensitive after WWII about not being seen as trying to dominate Europe.One of the realities is, after the financial crisis, Germany is dominant inEurope. So they struggle with how they can be dominant without appearing to bedominating. German friends who find it frustrating that they give money toother countries, and the other countries still criticize Germany. Welcome tothe role of being the big power. It will be that way with the U.S. for sometime. It will happen with China, but it will happen with China in a differentway. You're going to be the people who help determine this future. It'simportant for all our countries, as well as the global system. If you thinkabout being born in this time and space, what an exciting opportunity!
