Hello, welcome to visit Shanghai Forum
[The ultimate goal of the Concert is to prevent any one country from dominating the system while at the same time avoiding escalating rivalry between them.]
Reporter: In The China Choice, you make the point that China and America should treat each other as equal partner rather than strategic rival, although it is a hard choice for the both. So why it’s so hard for the two major powers to change their perspectives?
Hugh White: There are two main reasons why it’s so difficult for them to treat one another as equal partner. The first is that it requires them to step back from what they want to do. It’s a very deep question about identity for both countries. Americans as a community are very deeply committed to the idea that America is the leading power. They have not yet begun to acknowledge that America’s role in the future is going to be different from its role in the past. So the idea that treating any country as equal is very difficult for America. Likewise, China has a very deep sense of itself as a great power in its own system. China’s image of itself is very deeply shaped by its extraordinary long history as a centrally powerful state. It is very natural for China to aspire to be the leading power in Asia. And I think in a sense that aspiration is amplified by the sense in China of the centuries of humiliation since the Opium Wars and European and American penetration into Asia. So both for America and for China, to reach an accommodation in which they accept the other as an equal partner in Asia is going to require them to step back from very deeply seated ambitions and aspirations in sense of their own identity, which is very difficult.
The second point is that both of them believe they don’t have to make compromises. America tends to believe that China will in the end accept American primacy as a foundation of the Asian order. China believes that America will be willing to step back from Asia and leave China to reach the primary power in the end. And if they both believe the other is willing to step back, they don’t believe they need to make compromises. So only if they both understand that the other is very strong and very determined will they recognize the alternative, the compromise is necessary to avoid escalating rivalry.
Reporter: Political leaders in the U.S. often call China as a “responsible stakeholder”. So what is the difference between a “responsible stakeholder” and an “equal partner”?
Hugh White: That is America’s idea that China is a responsible stakeholder. It’s not an idea of China as an equal partner. It’s an idea of a China who is willing to conform to U.S. ideas about the international system. A responsible stakeholder is someone who supports the order that’s determined by the United States rather than challenges the U.S.-led order. So I think that phrase has never provided a robust foundation for future U.S.-China relationship.
Reporter: China and America have already worked together to build some institutions and mechanisms to avoid miscalculation and unintended conflicts between the two countries, such as the hotline mechanism. What influence can this kind of mechanisms have on the relations between the two countries?
Hugh White: I think those mechanisms are very helpful as far as I go, but I don’t think the evidence so far suggests that they are really helping to address the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is that the U.S. and China have different, mutually incompatible views of the nature of their relationship. And things like hotlines mechanisms and strategic economic dialogues provide a good mechanism for managing day-to-day questions. But they don’t provide mechanism for resolving those deeper issues about the nature of the future relationship. And in some ways, they encourage a kind of complacency. Many my American friends, for example, say they think the relationship with China can be managed easily because they got all these dialogues. But I don’t think these dialogues grasp the really significant issues.
Reporter: So what measures can China and America take to help them treat each other as partner gradually?
Hugh White: Well, I think the political leadership is the most essential mechanism for changing people’s view of themselves. It might happen that countries do go through changes of identity. For example, you can think of Deng Xiaoping’s role in changing China’s understanding of itself and in moving China away from a self-image defined by the old communist economic order and resistance of the market, an image which was very important in China’s self-identity in the post-1949 period. Deng Xiaoping led China out of that. Likewise, in the U.S. case, for example, Franklin Roosevelt led America out of its isolationism into an active engagement in the world. And I think, in both cases, that was really partly by necessity, but also that necessity was brought home to American voters, brought home to Chinese people by the political leaders clearly demonstrating why was essential that they should happen.
Reporter: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is seen to be the economic dimension of the “Asia Rebalancing” strategy. Some people think that America just wants to share the dividends of the regional integration in Asia-Pacific. Others hold the view that it’s containment. What’s your opinion about the debate?
Hugh White: Different people in Washington see the TPP in different ways. Some trade people in Washington see the TPP very much as a trade and economic initiative. I think the central place the TPP is been given in the US Asian diplomacy over the last few years since about 2011 also reflects a view that TPP can function as a way of reducing China’s influence over its Asian neighbors. Some people in the other side have the idea that TPP will allow the United States to reshape the Asian economic order, to put America again at the central of that order and to marginalize China’s influence. If I was China, I wouldn’t be very worried about that because I don’t think it will work. It’s always an illusion. But I think at least some people in the US have that aim.
Reporter: What can China do about the TPP in your opinion? Try hard to join or not?
Hugh White: I think China should join if it suits China. In the end, this deal is never good or bad itself. Whether it’s good or not depends on whether it actually works for China on the economic side. If China can negotiate a satisfactory basis to join it, you have no reasons not to. But I don’t think TPP is always going to happen. I don’t think it will prevail in the U.S. Senate. You know that Obama has not yet had an agreement by the Senate to negotiate the deal. And I think it will be extraordinary hard to get it. It will likely to be one of those ideas that just die away. But if it doesn’t die away I don’t think it will work.
Reporter: We know that economic interdependence may alter the calculation of costs and benefits when a country is going to take some measures and may promote peace and stability potentially. Do you think the integration of economics in the Asia-Pacific which deepen the interdependence is promoting peace and stability of the region? To what extent does it alleviate the political tensions in the Asia-Pacific?
Hugh White: The economic interdependence of the countries in the Asia-Pacific is very important for their future relationship and gives a good ground for optimism that the U.S. and China can build a stable relationship. But it doesn’t guarantee it. And in some ways, I think, the interdependence almost works to increase the risk of rivalry because it increases the sense on both sides that they don’t have to compromise because the other side will. I don’t think the interdependence in anyway makes strategic rivalry impossible. It provides a good incentive to avoid it. But it only provides incentive to avoid it if the both sides recognize the impact on themselves as well as on the other side. I think at the moment that has not really happened.
Reporter: What can American and China do to help the cooperation in economic realm spill over into the political realm?
Hugh White: They have to talk about the question about identity. American political leader should stand up and talk to the people about the way in which China’s rise changes the balance of power, changes the distribution of power and present them with a country that is different to any country that has ever been dealt with before. And I think Chinese political leader have to explain to Chinese people that it’s not worth their while to try to push America out of Asia, they should be willing to accept America to continue to play a strong role in Asia. I think for both sides that will be very tough political talent, leadership talent.
Reporter: There are some potential hotspots in the region which demand the two powers’ attention. North Korea seems to be preparing for their fourth nuclear test. What role does North Korea play in Sino-U.S. relations?
Hugh White: I don’t think North Korea situation is as serious as the situation in the South China Sea or the East China Sea. North Korea is not really an issue that divides the US and China. American sometimes complains that China doesn’t do its best, but that’s not an issue big enough and important enough that pushes US and China towards conflicts.
But the issue in the East China Sea between Japan and China is terribly serious for the United States because if there is a clashing in the East China Sea between China and Japan, the Japanese would ask the United States for military support. And if the United States didn’t provide the military support, it would very seriously damage the U.S.-Japan relationship. And that would also very seriously damage America’s position in the Asia-Pacific. So I think that’s a much more dangerous situation. The situations really need to be worried about since they could easily draw the U.S. and China into directly conflicts.
Reporter: As we can see there are lots of tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Are China and America testing each other’s determination?
Hugh White: That’s exactly right. Will America stand by its allies? China is testing it and saying “OK, are you really prepared to stand by your allies?” And America walks back and then moves forward again. Sometimes it talks very strongly as president Obama did in Tokyo, talks very strongly about supporting Japan militarily. But other times it is very cautious about that. So I think the U.S. has a mixed message on that. China is continuing to test that. And America, I think, keeps on thinking that as long as America makes clear enough statements, China would back off. That is going to be a risk. America think China will back off, China thinks America will back off.
Reporter: To avoid this kind of escalating rivalry between major powers, you advance the new concept “Concert of Asia”, so what are the main differences between Concert of Asia and other institutions already in the region?
Hugh White: A concert model is based on a very clear understanding between the great powers in the system that they will treat one another as equal. And they will not infringe others’ core interests. And they will, in doing that, also respect some core principles of international order like non-aggression and that sort of things. So I think it’s a very demanding thing to do. It’s very hard to set up a concert particularly because a concert in Asia will have to include not just the U.S. and China, but also Japan and India. It’s a very difficult but it’s possible and it will be, I think, the most peaceful outcome.
The ultimate goal of the Concert is to prevent any one country from dominating the system while at the same time avoiding escalating rivalry between them. You can avoid any one come to dominate the system with a balance of power structure. But the balance of power structure uses strategic rivalry to prevent primacy.
Trouble of using strategic rivalry to prevent any one country achieving primacy is that it carries such a strong risk of conflicts and wars. And a concert is a way of avoiding primacy while at the same time minimizing the risks of conflicts.
Reporter: We know that Russia is also a very powerful country. Why Russia will not be in the Concert of Asia?
Hugh White: Because I think Russia’s principle preoccupations are in Europe. It’s not to say that Russia is not an important country. Look at Russia’s neighbors in Asia. China is a big one, a very big, very powerful country. Look at Russia’s neighbors in Europe, like Ukraine, the Baltic States and Belarus. I think Russia’s strategic identity and its strategic opportunities are very pushed towards focusing on Europe rather than on Asia. I don’t think in the end Russia is going to be big enough and important enough to really deserve a place at table. Any deal, any kind of arrangement, which the US, China, Japan, India all agree on, Russia will has no choice but to go along with. So I don’t think it’s really quite a great power in Asia. It’s not to say it’s irrelevant. It’s obviously an important country.
Reporter: There are also many small powers in the region. How do the U.S., China, Japan and India deal with the problems that are related to them?
Hugh White: If the U.S., China, Japan and India all agree on an Asian order, then the rest of the countries including countries like Australia will have no choice but to accept what they agree on. So we just have to hope they agree on something that will work for us. And that’s a risk for we smaller little powers. But the alternative is to live in a region in which the great powers don’t get on, don’t agree, and in which they are likely to be at war with one another. So any smaller little power has to ask whether they rather live in a region in which the great powers are agreeing with one another and colluding with one another, in ways that may be against smaller little power’s interests, or they rather live in a region in which great powers aren’t agreeing with each one another, in which they competing with even fighting with each other. And I think, particularly in the era of nuclear weapons, the prospect of conflicts between great powers is worse than the consequences of cooperation between them.
Hugh White:
Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies and Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He was previously the Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence in the Department of Defence and also the first Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). His work focuses primarily on Australian strategic and defence policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, and global strategic affairs.
