Hello, welcome to visit Shanghai Forum
Reporter：Could you elaborate on the “new model of great power relations”? How is the new type of great power relations influenced by both countries’ silent pursuit of policies (counter) balancing each other’s influence and power? Exactly which implications does the “new type of great power relations” have for the stability and balance in the wider Asian and Pacific region?
Christopher K. Johnson：Let’s address the second question first, my own sense is that the whole reason why president Xi chose to come up with a new style of great power relations, is that he understands that fundamentally the track record of a rising power and an enduring power meeting on the world stage has not always ended particularly well, and certainly US leaders have also endorsed that part of the concept that indeed we do want to avoid conflict with Asia. To be frank, I think that the Chinese approach to the new style of great power relations has contradictions within itself since on the one hand you can clearly see elements of this desire to have a stabilizing effect to create something called “the relationship” that is somehow above all of the day to day tactical fighting. I think the best manifestation of that approach is president Xi’s order to the Chinese military to improve military to military relations between the two sides. So that’s obviously very encouraging and hopeful. I think though that we can see elements of the other side of it which is that what China seeks with this concept is to basically engineer US acquiescence to a series of sort of Chinese priorities. Wang Yi, the foreign minister, gave his press conference in March and he described the definition of the new style of great power relations. It was mutual respect for core interest, non-interference in the others affairs, I mean basically China’s core interests, and it didn’t list issues such as US interest in support for global rules and norms and these sort of things. So I think it’s very much a concept in development at this point. I think it’s a good concept and I think it is what we should be striving for. The question is, are people who have influence, in both systems, are taking it seriously enough to try and do something about it. As Mr. Da Wei mentioned in the sub-forum of China-US relations today, this is a leader to leader discussion on the working level while other people don’t have the authority to be able to do it.
Reporter： This week the CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia) was held in Shanghai, promoting a more comprehensive security cooperation within Asia. Why do you think China's strategic direction shifted from a more low profile focused on economic development towards active engagement in Asia's security cooperation? Why in your opinion does Asia need a new security concept as proposed by Xi Jinping during the CICA?
Christopher K. Johnson：There’s a number of reasons for that. Probably the main one is having to do with their assessment of the US rebalance strength to Asia, and the timing of the way the US side rolled it out, and what the Chinese were grappling with at that time meant that the Chinese kind of deferred a serious internal assessment of what it means. And they were trying to go through their leadership transition, former president Hu as the departing president certainly did not want to handcuff his successor and president Xi as the guy in waiting didn’t want to overstep and be cautious. So what’s been interesting to me is how quickly they have been able to manage this assessment. I think this kind of things, like the discussion at CICA, reflects their approach which is that the US rebalance basically is the chief obstacle to China’s rise. I feel that this is a strong viewpoint here. The line in his speech about Asian security for Asians certainly reflects some of that idea. It would have been helpful if he could have made that statement, kept it in there, but also had something in the line of “we’re of course acknowledging the US role”. So I think part of the reason is this, the second part is that president Xi has been very clear in his public speeches, especially after the plenum last year, you cannot extricate the domestic from the foreign, the two are together. This is why in the national security commission they combine both, domestic security and external security. It leans a little more to the domestic security side but they’re both present. So I think this is the fundamental point of view, there was certainly a sense of president Xi and others around it that the heavy domestic part with the plenum had been done and now they need to speak to the security issue. I think the most interesting is that with all these domestic issues that they’re facing they are more than able to manage this kind of pretty robust foreign policy.
Reporter：China recently tried to promote the role of the ASEAN+6 and APEC in the region to weaken the influence of the US as a reaction to Japan joining the TPP talks. In China the accusation of the US trying to contain China through this TPP is frequently heard. To what extent do you think TPP is a way of containment or at least a counterbalance of China’s growing influence?
Christopher K. Johnson：Not at all, I mean this is my view, and in fact as we are beginning to see from Chinese reactions to TPP 18 months ago, the exclusive line coming from China about TPP is exactly that the TPP has been designed to frustrate Chinese rise and contain China economically. Now you see much more not positive but much more neutral commentary coming from Chinas side. I think it is because much like the hope for a bilateral investment treaty between the US and China， there is an understanding that where the TPP will force the Chinese domestic economy to go in terms of meeting the standard to be able to join the TPP, is exactly where they need to go for their own domestic development. It’s much like when China joined the WTO in the late 90’s, where the former premier Zhu Rongji at that time used an external agency to do difficult things at home which were too hard in a domestic context. Therefore definitely the Chinese context of the TPP is improving. Certainly though as you pointed out, they understand very well that Japan is not doing this for economic reasons， Japan is doing it for geostrategic reasons. But again, that may accelerate the process by which they’re willing to move to a standard which is better for the domestic economy. I think what’s interesting in China’s approach is how they begun to emphasize the FTAAP as a possible counterweight to the TPP. I think it’s because they recognize in the same way as they’re doing things in the security space, it’s better to push back a little bit on the present Obama trip. I think likewise the failure between the US and Japan to come to an agreement on TPP has given the Chinese an opening and they’re trying to exploit that.
Reporter：Recently, President Obama, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Park Geun-hye met in Hague during the Nuclear Security Summit as an effort to bring the US’ closest allies in the Asia Pacific region closer together. How has this been received by China?
Christopher K. Johnson：I think China read The Hague trilateral in a couple of different ways. On one hand, it would be of concern because once again it’s kind of emphasizing US alliances in the region as the approach which China argues as Cold War style of mentality. On the other hand, the mere fact that the US had to work very hard to get the South Koreans and Japanese to sit down together, should be of some reassurance to the Chinese, because what the Chinese fear the most is close supportive trilateral US-South Korea-Japan security cooperation. So that’s certainly of concern.
Reporter：During Obama’s recent visits to Asia not only did he reaffirm the efforts to bring South Korea and Japan closer together， he also assured Japan of his support to Japan’s new direction towards collective self-defense. How do you think these efforts of the US are received by China and what are the implications for the region if Japan, next to being an economic power in the region will also becomes a military power? Especially considering its sensitive history, how will these intentions and the US’ support be received?
Christopher K. Johnson：With regard to Abe’s security agenda, China is very suspicious. They see it as the remilitarization of Japan. What’s interesting is that, Chinese may be right in this, is that they do see through that Shinzo Abe is not an economics guy, but a defensive security guy. Therefore, he is pursuing the economic program because he knows that is what he needs to do to keep his job. However, at the same time he understands intuitively that his own goals are about collective self-defense and therefore rewriting the constitution. He has attention from the US because he has been doing things that we have been wanting Japan to do for 50 years, as for example he passed a secrecy law, established a national security council and so on. But of course these are all going to be areas of huge concern for China.
Reporter：In that same visit, Obama also visited the Philippines where he signed an agreement allowing for more US troops in the Philippines. This all comes at a time where there has been tensions in the region concerning the territorial disputes of China with for example Japan, Philippines and Vietnam. Can the US act impartial even though the issues concern its allies in the region and US own interest? If it can’t, what are the implications for its relations with China who is strongly opposed to international interference in its domestic or bilateral affairs?
Christopher K. Johnson：We talked a lot about this in the sub-forum we just had, and I think the main challenge for the US is “how do we reaffirm the relationship with our allies while also maintaining the strategic balance in the region?” I think typically the Washington administrations have to choose how they are going to manage the relationship with China in two ways. You either manage it from the outside in by working with allies and partners in the region to shape China’s behavior and to shape its approach, or you work from the inside out by emphasizing the US-China relationship and then managing things with the rest. I think what’s happened is that because of China’s growth and its rise, it’s getting harder for the administration to be able to choose one of those two paths. Because increasingly you have to do both at the same time which is very hard to do. So I think the challenge for the US is that if we’re going to make a particular policy decision in a bilateral agreement, whether it’d be our relationship with the Philippines, Japan or China, we have to put a little more thought into thinking about how the other players in the region are going to deal with that decision. For example if vice president Biden comes to China and he endorses the new type of great power relation, this is of great concern to not only Japan but other regional parties. Mainly because they feel that now the US and China have cut a deal and the rest of them are left vulnerable. US’ power has been on a straight line and it is difficult to be the big guy but sometimes that’s just the way it is. And therefore you have to keep listening, listen to what you say and watch what you do since they will interpret and draw their own conclusions unless you explain to them what you’re saying and doing.
Reporter：How do you feel about the critique the West has on China about it not being a responsible stakeholder in the international order?
Christopher K. Johnson：I don’t think it really is a fundamental problem. International observers understand that China has its own interest just like any other country has interests. And we have to understand that they are going to pursue their own interests. The notion of the G2 concept in which the US and China will follow a certain set of global rules and norms and basically co-run the world is an anathema to the Chinese. They don’t want to sign on to that because their main fear is, by doing so, they take on a lot of responsibilities and waste their resources. So any honest assessment of Chinese reaction to these events would indicate that they’re just doing what makes sense. We don’t have to like it obviously but we should be modest in our expectations of what we think China is willing to do. This is a challenge that China faces not only in this neighborhood but for example in its policy towards Africa, where they get very frustrated because they’re pouring a lot more money into Africa than Europe or the US are, yet in soft power wise, the US and Europe still have a lot more power there than they do. So when it comes to the whole concept of soft power or how to be a responsible country, they’re still figuring this stuff out and it’s not necessarily innate to Chinese culture. Chinese culture is somewhat transactional. “I give you something I get something in return” and embracing this idea of global public goods is something they’re still learning about.
Christopher K. Johnson:
