SHF2017丨Richard Bush: The East Policy of Donald Trump: Adapting to a Changing RegionSHF2017丨Richard Bush: The East Policy of Donald Trump: Adapting to a Changing Region

It’s a great pleasure to be here inShanghai. Frankly, I live in a post-modernist hell, Washington D. C. It’s ahell where competing narratives Trump, objective facts, where deconstructionTrump’s collective action. It’s a great pleasure to participate in thisinternational conference, where people from all over the world come to discussa wide array of issues bearing on the future of the globe. I want to thank theKorean Foundation of Academic Studies, Fudan University, the Fudan DevelopmentInstitute and my good friend, Professor Wu Xinbo, for inviting me. I’mprivileged to be part of this first panel.

To resonate a little bit with ProfessorDuara’s presentation, I will note that my late father was a missionary in EastAsia for a good bit of his career, so he did his bit for American culturalimperialism. There are a lot of ways I could comment on Professor Mitter’spresentation, but I will only say that I think that the struggle that is goingon about Trump’s policy towards Asia, which is a topic I was asked to speak on,really is a fight over the legacy of a post-war grand strategy towards theworld and towards East Asia. I think that the Trump administration is possiblyone of the strangest administrations in modern America history.

Let me start with the word policy. Forany policy area, we understand that term to include the following elements andprobably more: a set of guiding principles, an inventory of the interests andvalues at stake, the objectives to be achieved, the strategy and tactics to beemployed, an implementation, a method for evaluating performance and ways andmeans to establish and sustain public support. More over the term implies thatthese elements will be integrated in a logical and coherent hole to be sure noadministration, American or otherwise, has been successful in formulating suchpolicy for all issues, much less implementing them well, but that is what isattempted. Donald Trump’s approach to external policy during the presidentialcampaign was quite different. He expressed impulses and attitudes withoutcoherence; he fired off promises of what he would achieve, such as quicklywithdrawing from TPP, but he had no discussion of context, consequences or thedifficulties of implementation. He disdained truth and expert knowledge; heraised expectations and fostered fears, and seemed to enjoy doing so.

But there was a world view thatunderlay president Trump’s campaign, twits and twats, my colleague ThomasWright has studied his views going back three decades and concluded that Trumpwas both a mercantilist and an isolationist. In contrast, most of ourpost-World War II presidents have believed in free trade and an active Americanrole in world affairs. I have discussion about how Trump is really a part ofthe Jacksonian tradition, but I’m going to skip that for purposes of time. Themain point about Jackson is that he believed in that elites were bad and that eliteshad to be challenged and destroyed.

Now another general element of generalcontext is the policy process so far under President Trump. Most likely, youknow the process that was created after World War II to ensure that any foreignpolicy or national security issue would bring together the relevant agencieswho need to have a say on the formulation and implementation of policy based ontheir experience, knowledge and responsibilities. At each level of our processthere are mechanisms designed to force an interaction between differentagencies. The process does not always work as planned, but it is clear whatshould happen. In general, a good process does not necessarily guarantee goodpolicy outcomes, but a bad process almost guarantees bad outcomes. A good process does notguarantee good outcomes; a bad process guarantees that they will be bad.

Now another reason for creating thisinstitutionalized process was to constrain independent action by the president.And Franklin Roosevelt during his time in office dominated a very chaoticpolicy process and national security leaders did not wish to continue thatprocess. Now in President Trump we have a president who does not likeconstrains from agency official with their pro interests, and so-called experts.To some extent, the established process has broken down. It is employed on someissues and not others and we cannot assume that it is used on any specificissue. When the process is circumvented, that can affect the content of apolicy, most seriously it can mean that US national interests, which refer itpermanent and change only gradually, get ignored or destroyed. And I will saythat for anybody outside the United States who is trying to figure out USpolicy based on the statements of our president and different agencies, it’sreally hard, because the process is not working.

Now turning to the content of Asiapolicy under Donald Trump, his isolationist and mercantilist tendencies standin rather stark contrast to American security strategy after World War II. Thatwas not only forward deployment on both ends of the Eurasian land masteralliances, but also shaping the architecture for global and trans-pacificeconomic relations and encouraging good governance. I call this “comprehensiveforward deployment”.

Now, forward deployment of militaryforces not only preposition the capabilities needed for war-fighting if warshould ever come, but also enhance deterrence by sharpening the risk calculusof France and adversaries alike, reassuring allies and warning enemies. Likecops on the beach, moreover, the constant presence of American forces in EastAsia fostered a long period of relative regional stability, the Vietnam war isthe major exception. There were of course important economic and political andcultural elements to US policy, but forward deployment was the key. Asianalliances were never seen as favors to countries concerned, no matter whatDonald Trump thinks, American leaders believed that helping to keep our friendssafe would better secure the safety of our own homeland. Building the globaland regional economic architecture of an open-trading system also had astrategic purpose, no matter what Donald Trump thinks, because it fostered theprosperity and stability of friendly countries and induced our own growingcompetitiveness.

Now the United States-led securityorder was not completely static, in a dramatic shift as Rana mentionedPresident Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter brought about the post-1978 emergenceof China from past isolation. This actually reinforced America’s based strategyand fostered a stable environment in which the countries of the region,including China itself, accelerated economic growth and in some cases made thetransition to democracy. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 altered theAsian environment, but some US allies sort of pulled away but globalizationthrew all countries of the region and other economies together for the benefitof all.

Now from this historical perspective, Iwould say that the Obama administration’s rebalance approach was not really anew initiative, rather it was the adaptation of a very old strategy to a newset of circumstances, the main circumstance being the revival of China as agreat power, not the rise of China. But this was not a containment policy and Ican talk about that more if you want. Let me just say that the policy impulsesthat Donald Trump brought with him to the White House were very different. Hequestioned whether US alliances and the globalized economy created fair outcomesfor Americans. I personally believe that his accusations of unfairness in bothmilitary alliance and economic areas betrayed ignorance of the details of ourpast security policy. Trump’s approach to North Korea ignored the limits ofChinese leverage on Pyongyang and the negative consequences of unilateral USmilitary action. And as you all know, not long after the election, he suggestedthat the United States’ One China policy was subject to negotiation and not thefoundation of US policy towards China.

Now let us move to the situation afterJanuary 20th. I think fairly quickly Trump’s team changed its approach, orbegan to change its approach not unlike previous presidents. So first, seniorofficials reassure Japan and Korea of our commitment to their defense, sayingthat the campaign focuses on burden-sharing with directed at NATO, not them.Second, US officials reaffirm the application of Article 5 of the US-Japansecurity treaty. Third, Prime Minister Abe was the first foreign leader to meetTrump after his inauguration. Fourth, an old theme emerged and that wasalliances with a foundation of America’s Asia policy. Fifth, there was outreachto China. Donald Trump told President Xi Jinping that he would honor “the OneChina policy”. And at the same time the administration reaffirmed long-standingpolicy towards Taiwan. And finally Xi Jinping and Donald Trump had an earlysummit and an initial positive tone for US-China relations. However, a lot ofthese signals are at the level of rhetoric; rhetoric can change and in somecases rhetoric has changed. And so it’s not clear how these initial steps willbe reflected in long-term subtenant policy, uncertainties abound. One area isnot uncertain, in my view Donald Trump does not like multi-lateral trade agreementsin general and TPP in particular. I think TPP was really good for the UnitedStates and withdrawal from TPP raises questions in the minds of our friends inAsia, regarding our strategic intentions. The administration is more likely tofocus on tighter enforcement of existing trade agreements and the negotiationof bilateral ones. Also likely in a short term it’s policy conflict withinTrump’s economic team and I can talk more about that in question time if youwant.

There is a real issue in US economicrelations we all agree that economic relations among all countries should yieldmutual benefit. If the US’s trying an economic relationship that is asymmetricin its outcomes, the true governments need to adjust their policies to ensurewin-win solutions. But I think frankly, there’s an apparent flaw in President Trump’sthinking about international relations, that is he doesn’t seem to understandthat a product that is labeled “Made in China” necessarily has the entire valueof the product created in China. And for many products that Americans import,the value added in China and other Asian economies is quite high and so UStrade statistics are quite misleading. In my view, reported trade deficits perse should not be the bases of trade policy. I think Trump fundamentallymisunderstands the reasons for America’s economic problems and I am franklymystified why the US Business Community has been so silent about what Trump hashad to say about trade policy. President Trump’s ignorance of global economics doesnot mean that US-China economic relations are asymmetric in their benefits.There are a lot of issues we need to address: the hundred-day plan fromMar-a-Lago was a good start, but whether it will yield a long-term benefit forboth is a good question. North Korea, I think, presents a difficult policychannel challenge for the United States, China and other countries of NortheastAsia. In the short term, Mr. Trump appears to have moved towards a policy basedon common sense, rather than flawed assumptions. It is reported that PresidentXi Jinxing at Mar-a-Lago was able to explain the complexity of China’srelationship with North Korea and its interests concerning North Korea. Andthat is a good thing.

I am going to skip over that part.

On North Korea, we should not ignorethat trend of Pyongyang’s policy is dangerous. Once the DPRK is able to hit thecontinental United States with nuclear weapons, it will be stabilizing thestatus quo in this region. Washington will have to retailor its deterrencewarnings to Pyongyang and strengthen its extended deterrence, assurances toSeoul and Tokyo, all actors including China will have to address thepossibility, or perhaps the likelihood that Pyongyang will become more recklessbelow the strategic level. I think that the initial high alarm that USofficials express towards North Korea and some of the specific steps we tookwere an overreaction. I think that things are calming down. We will be morerestrained, but the fundamental problem of North Korea’s intentions and thedetermined way it is perusing those intentions, despite the willingness of allto have negotiations on the future of its nuclear program, is a fundamentalreality. And we could be talking about a long-term policy of containmenttowards North Korea.

My two basic conclusions up to thispoint are as follows. First, in the Trump administration, the process of policyformulation and implementation is as important as the content of policy, insome cases process will induce good policy, and others it will not. The tensionbetween the institutionalized agencies of our government and their approach topolicy and President Trump’s tendencies sometimes, to speak his mind, willcontinue. Second, Trump’s Asia policy appears to be moving back to the norm ofprevious administrations, that norm is “comprehensive forward deployment”. TheUnited States has been an active player in the East Asian region militarily,economically, politically and in other ways. We’ve done so in our owninterests, but also because we believe that our presidents have providedsecurity and stability for the nations of the region, including China. The USgoal is not to contain China, but to shape its direction in ways that willcontribute to regional peace and stability. I cannot guarantee that we will beas successful in the future as we were in the past, the Trump campaignsuggested that we would move in a destabilizing direction and we will seewhether the return to the norm continues.

I do wish to develop one final and muchbroader theme, one that has nothing to do with Asia directly, but could haveprofound implications for Asia. Now in my view, “comprehensive forwarddeployment” by the United States was possible because America came out of WorldWar II with strong pillars of national power that has sustained for at leasttwo decades. And most of these strong pillars were domestic; there were resultof the war time build-up but there was also the result of half a century oftechnological change and political reform. Now what are those pillars? I wouldsay, a productive and strong economy, which in term is sustained by responsibleand fair fiscal and monetary policy, a capable civil service to regulate thoseparts of the capitalist economy that need regulating and educational systemthat produces the human capital appropriate to each stage of economic growth,which is a type of public good, state-funded infrastructure building andmaintenance, another type of public good, state support for science andtechnology creation and engineering capability, yet another type of publicgood, state support for responsible social welfare measures like healthcare andold-age pensions, a strong balanced and independent rule of law, institutionsto control the relationship between money and politics, and a strong militarythat has the ability to deter war and to fight wars when deterrence fails butpolicy restraint about when we intervene.

Now it’s my belief that the UnitedStates has allowed many of the pillars of our national power to atrophy overthe last three or four decades, the main exception has been the militarypillar, but even that has serious weaknesses. There are many reasons for thisatrophy, but the principle one in my humble and perhaps? view is thatconservative forces in America have waged the sustained battle against theprogressive tax system. For those conservative forces reducing the tax bill ofthe wealthy has a higher priority than maintaining the pillars of nationalpower. Those forces have captured much of our political system part by playingon the grievances of those sectors of our society who are left behind. So in away Donald Trump is a symptom of a much larger phenomenon. The power ofconservative political forces has deliberately deprived the government ofresources it needs to ensure that they can fund the provision of public goodsand sustain the pillars of national power. All of these races, the possibility,the tragic possibility to my mind, that the role of the United States in EastAsia will decline, not because of a lack of resources, but because of a lack ofwill, or even worse, because of self-inflicted wounds. I really hope that I’mwrong in this assessment because I think our role in East Asia has over thelong term and overall been positive for this region. But I cannot dismiss thepossibility that I’m right and that everybody else will have to adjust to it.